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3Abstract: In complete markets economies (Sandroni [16]), or in economies with Pareto
optimal outcomes (Blume and Easley [10]), the market selection hypothesis holds, as
long as traders have identical discount factors. Traders who survive must have beliefs
that merge with the truth. We show that in incomplete markets, regardless of traders’
discount factors, the market selects for a range of beliefs, at least some of which do
not merge with the truth. We also show that impatient traders with incorrect beliefs can
survive and that these incorrect beliefs impact prices. These beliefs may be chosen
so that they are far from the truth.
KEYWORDS: Incomplete markets, market selection, efficient markets, belief con-
vergence.
41 Introduction
Do markets select for correct expectations? The market selection hypothesis (Alchian
[1], Friedman [13]) is one of the longest standing conjectures in economics. Traders
who form more accurate predictions about future returns make more money at the ex-
pense of those who don’t. In the long run all traders with inaccurate beliefs are driven
out of the market and the only surviving ones have correct expectations. This hy-
pothesis has a strong intuitive appeal and, if true, provides a robust justification to the
assumption of rational expectations in both microeconomic and macroeconomic mod-
els. Given that long run market outcomes only reflect correct expectations, economists
interested in the long run may as well assume rational expectations from the outset.
To test the validity of this conjecture, suppose that two traders disagree on the proba-
bility with which a particular state of nature occurs. If this disagreement does not have
an impact on asymptotic wealth accumulation and survival, then Friedman’s conjecture
does not hold. Hence the market selection hypothesis requires that the trader with cor-
rect expectations is able to accumulate wealth at the other trader’s expense by betting
against him on the future realisation of that particular state of nature. It is only when
there is a market that allows the two traders to make these bets that the trader with cor-
rect beliefs can actually accumulate more wealth than the other trader and drive him
out of the market. When a state of nature can only be partially insured against by the
existing market structure, the link between accuracy of beliefs and survival becomes
weaker.
We know that when markets are complete [16], or when the allocation is Pareto optimal
[10] correct beliefs are selected for by market forces1. In particular, heterogeneity of
beliefs does not persist, and all surviving traders have either correct beliefs or beliefs
which merge with the true probability distribution. Complete markets not only guaran-
tee efficiency of the real allocation, but also informational efficiency, in that they force
out incorrect beliefs. Blume and Easley [10] argue by providing counterexamples that
the same need not hold when markets are incomplete. In this paper we show that in
incomplete markets economies, regardless of traders’ discount factors, the set of be-
liefs which are consistent with traders’ survival contains beliefs that are not equivalent
to the true probability distribution. So the market selection hypothesis does not hold in
incomplete markets. We also show in a class of economies that there exist surviving
traders with beliefs that do not merge with the truth and these beliefs matter: were
they to adopt correct beliefs, equilibrium prices would change and they may no longer
survive. These surviving traders may be more impatient than other traders with cor-
rect beliefs. This stands in stark contrast to Blume and Easley’s result that surviving
traders must have either beliefs closer to the truth than other traders or be sufficiently
patient to compensate for their incorrect beliefs.
We consider an economy with an open ended future and a finite number of traders.
Every period, traders trade securities to hedge their stochastic endowment risk. Prefer-
ences are of the expected utility form and utility from future consumption is discounted
at a rate that is allowed to differ across traders. There are many consumption goods
1This assumes that traders discount future consumption at the same rate so that their degree of
impatience does not affect their survival.
5each period, but the securities pay off only in terms of a numeraire good. Also, se-
curities are short-lived. These last two assumptions do not affect the intuition of the
result but considerably simplify the analysis and guarantee existence of an equilibrium
(see Magill and Quinzii [15]). Otherwise, the asset structure is rather general in that
the payoff matrix may change from period to period. The infinite horizon economy
that we model satisfies conditions for existence of an equilibrium with a transversality
condition. This requires traders not to borrow and roll over their debt ad infinitum.
Our first result is that traders who survive admit beliefs that are not equivalent to the
true probability distribution. To prove our result, we introduce the notion of observa-
tionally equivalent beliefs as the set of probability distributions for some trader that
are consistent with the same overall equilibrium. Given an initial economy and its cor-
responding equilibrium, if some trader were to adopt beliefs that are observationally
equivalent to his original beliefs, then the new equilibrium outcome would remain un-
changed. We then show that the set of observationally equivalent beliefs is a singleton
under complete markets. By contrast, this set is not a singleton in incomplete mar-
kets. Moreover, there exists a probability distribution that belongs to this set that is
not equivalent to the truth. This has straightforward and important consequences for
belief selection in incomplete markets. Suppose that a trader survives, our first result
shows that there are probability distributions that are not equivalent to the truth which
are consistent with his survival. Hence incomplete markets fail to select for traders
with correct expectations.
While our first result shows that incomplete markets select for a wide range of beliefs,
our second result shows that surviving traders whose beliefs are incorrect affect asset
prices.We consider a two-trader economy and the corresponding no-trade outcome.
Assuming that the first trader has correct beliefs, we can assign a discount factor and
beliefs to the other trader such that she is more impatient than the first trader, has
incorrect beliefs and survives. These beliefs matter because the equilibrium price se-
quence of assets would change were she to adopt beliefs that are correct. This is be-
cause the truth does not lie within her set of observationally equivalent beliefs. Hence
traders with incorrect beliefs who survive need not behave as though they know the
truth. Note that these results do not hold in comparable complete markets economies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we summarise the existing liter-
ature. In section 3, we present the model: we start by providing the intuition for our
main results in a simple two-period model (subsection 3.1), then we go on to describe
the infinite horizon economy which always admits an equilibrium with a transversality
condition. Section 4 contains our first result. Section 5 contains our second result.
Section 6 concludes the paper. For ease of exposition, all proofs are in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
The first attempts to validate the market selection hypothesis date back to the early 90s
and address the related issue of whether markets select for rationality, with particular
focus on the survival of noise traders. Shefrin and Statman [18] ask whether noise
6traders survive in financial markets by developing a model where rational and informed
Bayesian traders interact with traders that make systematic cognitive errors. They
show that, provided that noise traders are patient enough and that they do not commit
errors that are “too serious”, they will not be driven to extinction by informed traders. De
Long et al. [11] and [12] prove that noise traders can eventually come to dominate the
market, if they unwillingly happen to make “good” cognitive mistakes. Biais and Shadur
[6] consider a market where non-overlapping generations of buyers and sellers trade
to share risk. They show that irrational traders, who misperceive the risk but enjoy a
higher bargaining power, might outperform rational traders who correctly assess the
distribution of the risk.
While this literature assumes asset prices to be exogenous, the paper by Blume and
Easley [9] addresses the same problem in a market model, where asset prices are
determined endogenously and reflect the dynamics of the wealth shares of the dif-
ferent types of traders, each represented by a portfolio rule. They find that, as long
as traders save at the same rate, markets do not select for rationality, but rather for
a specific attitude towards risk. In particular logarithmic utility maximisers with accu-
rate beliefs accumulate wealth at a faster rate than any other trader. As a result, they
determine asset prices asymptotically and drive to extinction any other trader. Hence
within this framework markets do not select necessarily for rationality, but rather for a
specific portfolio rule. Irrational traders, or traders with inaccurate expectations, may
well survive if their mistakes or irrationality imply that their portfolio rules are closer to
the portfolio rule of a log maximiser. On the other hand, rational traders with correct
expectations may well vanish, if they happen to have the wrong attitude towards risk.
The results from this early literature are important in that they formalise through wealth
dynamics what one might mean by market selection. They are also quite provocative
because they make it very clear that expected utility maximisation and survival are
distinct objectives. Hence rational behaviour is not necessarily selected for by market
forces and the market selection hypothesis need not hold within this setting.
Sandroni [16] adopts the same notion of market selection and survival as in Blume and
Easley [9], but differs from the earlier contributions in that he considers not only portfo-
lio decisions but also savings decisions to be endogenous. In a Lucas trees complete
markets economy where traders are expected utility maximisers and discount the fu-
ture at the same rate, he finds that under mild conditions on traders’ utility functions,
only traders with correct beliefs survive. Hence, among rational traders, complete
markets select for correct beliefs.
Blume and Easley [10] generalise Sandroni’s result to any Pareto optimal allocation.
For any optimal allocation, survival of traders is determined entirely by beliefs and
discount factors; in contrast with [9], risk attitudes do not matter for survival. Among
traders who discount future consumption at the same rate, it is those with most accu-
rate beliefs that survive, irrespective of their utility function. In particular, if there are
traders whose beliefs merge with the truth, they will be the only survivors. Blume and
Easley [10] provide two interesting counterexamples that show that the same results
need not carry through under market incompleteness, where in general allocations are
not Pareto optimal.
7In this paper we prove for a large class of incomplete markets economies that surviving
traders need not have beliefs that merge with the true probability distribution. The
fact that, under incomplete markets, opportunities to trade are restricted implies that
traders with incorrect beliefs are not wiped out by market forces. As a result surviving
traders’ beliefs do not necessarily merge either with the truth or with other traders’
beliefs, and so beliefs’ heterogeneity is persistent and may matter (see section 5).2
3 The Model
3.1 A Two-Period Example
Consider a two period economy with a unique consumption good and where there are
S possible states of the world tomorrow. Time is indexed by t = 0, 1. Traders can
trade J ≤ S securities whose period 1 payoff is the full rank S × J matrix A. They
trade these securities to hedge against their period 1 stochastic endowment ω ∈ RS++.
Consumption takes place in period 1 only. In an equilibrium, period 0 asset prices
q ∈ RJ++ have to satisfy the no arbitrage equation:
q =
πi1
πi0
A (1)
where πi1 ∈ R
S
++ is trader i’s utility gradient and where π
i
0 ∈ R++ is a multiplier.
The resulting ratio
πi
1
πi
0
is trader i’s normalized utility gradient or his state price vector.
In the complete markets case, we get the usual condition that this ratio is equated
across traders.3 Note that πi1 (s) = ρ
i(s)vi′(xi(s)) when traders have preferences of
the expected utility form and their beliefs are represented by the probability distribution
ρi. In the complete markets case, given an equilibrium outcome (x∗, q∗), there exists
only one set of beliefs (an S−dimensional normalized vector ρi) such that q∗πi0 = π
i
1A
where πi1 (s) = ρ
i(s)vi(x∗i(s)). This is because there are S equations in S unknowns.
The only solution is the original normalized vector ρi ∈ RS.
In the incomplete markets case, J < S and this system of equations may have mul-
tiple solutions. So, given an economy and a resulting equilibrium outcome, and for
any trader i ∈ I, there exist many probability distributions that are consistent with the
original equilibrium: The latter is also an equilibrium of any economy where all traders’
preferences remain unchanged, except for trader i. His beliefs can be any λi = ρi such
that q =
πi′1
πi
0
A where πi′1 now represents trader i’s utility gradient under the new beliefs
2A related paper is Beker and Chattopadhyay [4]: while here we show that the set of surving traders
will always admit traders with incorrect beliefs, they show that incomplete markets economies may
admit equilibria where traders with correct beliefs do not survive. See section 6 for a more detailed
comparison.
3Equation (1) can be given the familiar form q = ψE(V ) where the expectation is taken with respect
to some probability distribution. In the complete markets case, this probability distribution is unique.
The scalar ψ represents the price of a bond that pays off one unit of consumption in each state (if that
bond exists).
8λi. When J < S, these beliefs exist. The intuition of this analysis is essentially the
same in infinite horizon economies and ultimately drives our main result.
Turning to the case of infinite horizon economies, suppose that traders trade the same
set of short-lived securities whose payoff next period is the matrix A. The no arbitrage
equation takes the form:
q(st) =
πit+1(st)
πi(st)
A (2)
where πit+1(st) ∈ R
S
++ is trader i’s utility gradient for period t + 1 when the current
state of the world is st and where π
i(st) ∈ R++ is the marginal utility of consumption
in node st of the date-event tree. Again, we consider the case of expected utility
maximizers. Consider a particular economy and the resulting equilibrium outcome.
Suppose that trader i ∈ I has beliefs represented by a probability distribution ρi. We
wish to construct a probability distribution λi = ρi such that the original equilibrium is
still an equilibrium when trader i ad opts beliefs λi. We do this by rewriting the no
arbitrage equation (2):
qt = ρ
i(t+ 1|st)M
i(st) (3)
where ρi(t + 1|st) ∈ R
S
++ is the conditional probability distribution of period t + 1
events, conditioning on the current state of the world st and where M
i(st) is an S ×
J matrix determined in equilibrium. We show that there exists a unique probability
distribution ρi which satisfies equation (3) in the complete markets case. When J < S,
one can choose conditional probabilities λi(t+ 1|st) = ρ
i(t+ 1|st) for each node in the
date-event tree. Then one can construct a probability distribution λi over infinite events
by using Kolmogorov’s existence theorem. This implies that in the incomplete markets
case, one can choose a probability distribution λi that is observationally equivalent to
ρi but such that λi = ρi.
One can also choose λi such that λi and ρi are not equivalent. This requires that the
marginals ρi(t + 1|st) are uniformly bounded away from the edges of the unit simplex.
We can then choose λi uniformly bounded away from ρi. The theorem of Blackwell
and Dubins [8] then implies that these distributions cannot be equivalent.
It follows that in an incomplete markets economy, observing a trader survive does not
imply that his beliefs are equivalent to the truth. The above procedure can be used to
construct beliefs for this trader that are not equivalent to the truth but that guarantee
his survival in a way that is identical to the original economy. This is in contrast to
the complete markets or Pareto efficient economy. In these economies and controlling
for discount factors, traders who survive must have the truth be absolutely continuous
with respect to their beliefs.
The second result, presented in section 5, shows that one can change both a trader’s
discount factor (by making her more impatient, for example) and her beliefs. If her
beliefs are chosen such that the marginals are bounded away from the unit simplex,
then one can find beliefs observationally equivalent to these new beliefs that are far
away from the truth. The outcome is that this trader will survive and her wrong beliefs
will influence equilibrium prices.
94 The Infinite Horizon Economy
The economy we model is a special case of the economy analyzed by Magill and
Quinzii [15].4 Our notation combines elements of [15], Araujo and Sandroni [3] and
Sandroni [16]. Let T = {0, 1, ..} denote the set of time periods. Every period, the set
of possible states is T = {1, .., S}, S ∈ N. T t is the t−Cartesian product of T . Let
S = {s0} × T∞ be the set of all possible infinite sequences of T where s0 ∈ T acts
as the root element. Throughout, we use the notation st = (s
0, s1, .., st) for an element
st ∈ T
t. All elements are taken to have {s0} as root so st ∈ T
t necessarily means st =
{s0} × ht−1 where ht−1 ∈ T
t−1. We can represent the information revelation process in
this economy through a sequence of finite partitions of the state space S. In particular,
define the cylinder with base on st ∈ T
t, t ∈ T as C(st) = {s ∈ T
∞|s = (st, ..)}. Let
Ft = {C(st) : st ∈ T
t} be a partition of the set S. Clearly, F =(F0, ..,Ft, ..) denotes
a sequence of finite partitions of S such that F0 = {S} and Ft is finer
5 than Ft−1. We
assume that all traders have identical information and that the information revelation
process is represented by the sequence F. Let D = ∪t∈T,σt∈Ft (t, σt) denote the date-
event tree and D+ = D−{(0, σ0)} = D−{s
0}. We use the short-hand notation st ∈ D,
meaning (t, σt) ∈ D where σt = C(st). DT (st) denotes the subset of successor nodes
of st at date T , i.e. all elements s
T ∈ T T such that sT = (st, ..). Let Ft be the set
consisting of all finite unions of cylinders with base on T t. It is easily shown that Ft is
a σ−field. Note that Ft = σ (Ft). Define F0 as the trivial σ−field. Let F = σ (∪t∈NFt). It
can be shown that {Ft}t∈N is a filtration. Let ρ
i be trader i’s beliefs on S represented by
a probability measure on (T∞,F). Let Eρ
i
be the expectation operator associated with
ρi. Let Eρ
i
(.|Ft)(s) = E
ρi
t (.)(s) be the expectation operator associated with ρ
i
st when
s = (st, ..) and where:
ρist(K) =
ρi((T t ×K) ∩ C(st))
ρi(C(st))
for any K ∈ S such that T t ×K ∈ F
There are I= {1, .., I} infinitely lived traders, L = {1, .., L} goods at each node. So
D× L is the set of all goods over all nodes. Let RD×L denote the vector space
of all maps x : D× L→ R. Let l∞(D× L) denote sequences x ∈ R
D×L such that
sup(st,l)∈D×L |xl(st)| <∞, the subspace of boundedmaps. Let ‖x‖∞ = sup(st,l)∈D×L |xl(st)|
denote the sup-norm of l∞(D× L). Also, let l1(D× L) denote sequences such that∑
(st,l)∈D×L
|xl(st)| <∞. Agent i has endowment
6
ω ∈ l+∞(D× L) = {x ∈ l∞(D× L) : xl(st) ≥ 0 for all ξ, l}
Let X i = l+∞(D× L) denote trader i’s consumption set. Let p ∈ R
D×L be the spot price
process and set p(st, 1) = 1 for all st ∈ D so 1 is the numeraire good.
7 Further, we
consider only short-lived numeraire securities. Let J(st) be the set of securities issued
4From a methodological point of view, this paper shows the utility of using the framework of the
GEI (general equilibrium with incomplete markets) model for establishing qualitative properties of an
equilibrium.
5σt ∈ Ft, σt−1 ∈ Ft−1 implies that either σt ⊂ σt−1 or σt ∩ σt−1 = ∅.
6Bewley [5] and subsequently Magill and Quinzii [15] impose the condition of Mackey contituity on
traders’ preferences. The Mackey topology on l∞(D× L) is described in [5].
7We can do this because securities in this economy pay only in terms of the numeraire good.
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at node st ∈ T
t. j(st) = #J(st) < ∞ is the number of securities. Aj(st, s) is the
payoff of security j ∈ J(st) in the immediate successor node (st, s) ∈ T
t+1. A(st, s) =[
A1(st, s), .., Aj(st)(st, s)
]
is the 1 × j(st) vector of security payoffs in immediate suc-
cessor node (st, s) ∈ T
t+1. Finally, let At+1(st) denote the S × j(st) matrix of payoffs
in period t + 1. Also, A = (A(st, s) : (st, s) ∈ D
+, t ∈ T) ∈ Πst∈DR
S×j(st) is the process
of security payoffs. We assume that all securities pay off in terms of the numeraire
good. Let q(st) = (qj(st) : j ∈ J(st)) be the 1× j(st) vector of node st security prices.
q = (q(st) : st ∈ D) ∈ Πst∈DR
J(st) = Q be the security price process, an element of the
security price space. zi = (zi(st) : st ∈ D) ∈ Πst∈DR
J(st) = Z be the portfolio process
for trader i, an element of the portfolio space, where zi(st) =
(
zij(st) : j ∈ J(st)
)
is the
j(st)× 1 portfolio vector of trader i at node st.
Let i represent trader i
′s preference ordering over Xi. Preferences i are repre-
sented by an additively separable utility function:
ui(xi) =
∑
st∈T t,t∈T
ρi(C(st))δ
t(s)
i v
i(xi(st)) = E
ρi
[∑
t∈T
δtiv
i(xit)
]
Where ρi(C(st)) is the probability of st ∈ T
t, δi ∈ (0, 1) is an intertemporal discount
factor and vi : RL+ → R is a continuous, increasing and concave function with v
i(0) = 0.
These assumptions on the utility function satisfy Mackey continuity (as shown in [5]).8
Let = (1, ..,I), ω =
(
ω1, .., ωI
)
. Finally, let E∞(D,, ω,A) denote the economy.
When all traders’ preferences are of the expected utility form, let ρ =
(
ρ1, .., ρI
)
, δ =
(δ1, .., δI) and v =
(
v1, .., vI
)
then E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) denote the economy in question.
Assumption A Endowments are uniformly bounded away from zero and aggregate
endowments are uniformly bounded. Formally, there is an m > 0 such that
ωil(st) > m for all i, st, l; moreover there is an m
′ > m > 0 such that
∑
i
ωil(st) <
m′ for all st, l.
Assumption B There exists a riskless bond at every node st ∈ D. Formally, there is
a j ∈ J(st) so that Aj(st, s) = 1 for all s ∈ T .
Assumption B can be replaced with the condition that for each node st ∈ D, there
exists a portfolio of securities z ∈ RJ(st) such that
∑
j
Aj(st, s)zj > 0 for all s ∈ T.
In this economy, assumptions A and B satisfy all conditions needed (see section 3 of
[15]) for the existence of an equilibrium in open-ended incomplete markets economies.
They are assumed to hold throughout this paper.
8[2] shows that Mackey continuity is needed to prove existence of an equilibrum in economies with
infinitely many commodities.
11
4.1 Equilibrium with a Transversality Condition
With the assumption that zi(s−1) = 0, and that preferences are strictly monotone, the
trader’s budget constraint at node st ∈ D is:
p(st)
(
xi(st)− ω
i(st)
)
= A(st)z
i(st−1)− q(st)z
i(st) for all st ∈ D (4)
In infinite horizon economies, a trader can borrow and roll over his debt ad infinitum.
So we need a transversality condition to ensure that there is a bound on the rate at
which the trader accumulates debt.
lim
T→∞
∑
sT∈DT (st)
πi(sT )q(sT )z
i(sT ) = 0 for all st ∈ D (5)
So the budget set for trader i is:
BTC∞ (p, q, π
i, ωi, A) =
{
xi ∈ l+∞(D× L) : ∃z
i ∈ Z satisfying (4) and (5)
}
Definition 1 An equilibrium of the economy E∞(D,, ω, A) is a pair (x, z), (p, q, (π
i)i∈I) ∈
l+∞(D× L×I)×Z
I × RD×L ×Q× l+1 (D× I) such that:
1. (xi, zi) is imaximal in B
TC
∞ (p, q, π
i, ωi, A)
2. for each i ∈ I:
(a) πi(st) > 0,for all st ∈ D and P
i ∈ l+1 (D× L) where P
i = (P i(st), st ∈
D) = (πi(st)p(st), st ∈ D)
(b) xi is imaximal in B∞(P
i, ωi) = {xi ∈ l+∞(D× L) : P
i(xi − ωi) ≤ 0}
(c)
πi(st)qj(st) =
∑
st+1=(st,s)
πi(st+1)Aj(st+1) for all j ∈ j(st), st ∈ D (6)
3.
∑
i∈I
(xi − ωi) = 0
4.
∑
i∈I
zi = 0
Theorem 1 Each economy E∞(D,, ω, A) satisfying the above assumptions has an
equilibrium.
Proof. Theorem 5.1 in [15].
The assumption that assets must be short-lived and must pay off in terms of a nu-
meraire good ensures that an equilibrium exists. Is it however only a simplifying as-
sumption as the results in this paper rest on analyzing the no arbitrage equation which
must hold in equilibrium regardless of the particular asset structure.
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5 Belief Selection
5.1 Observationally Equivalent Beliefs
The set of beliefs that a trader adopts that yield the same equilibrium outcome is the
set of observationally equivalent beliefs for this trader, defined below.
Definition 2 Suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an equilibrium of an economy E∞ (D, ρ, v, ω, A).
We say that trader i’s beliefs ρi are observationally equivalent to λi (a probability
measure on (S,F)) if there exists an equilibrium (x, z), (p, q, (ψi)i∈I) of the economy
E∞ (D, ρ
′, v, ω,A) where ρ′ =
(
ρ1, .., ρi−1, λi, ρi+1, .., ρI
)
. We write ρi ∈
[
λi
]i
E∞
.
A sufficient condition for a probability distribution ρi to be observationally equivalent
to the beliefs of some trader is that the no-arbitrage equation (6) is satisfied where
πi(st) = ρ
i(C(st))δ
t
iv
i
1(x
i(st)). As beliefs change, so does the way traders value the fu-
ture. Hence, the definition imposes that equilibrium allocations and prices are identical
for different (but observationally equivalent) beliefs. The resulting state price process
for trader i is different precisely because the probability distributions ρi and λi are dif-
ferent.
Equilibrium security prices can reveal some information about a trader’s beliefs. The
price of a security in node st represents trader i’s marginal utility of consuming the
stream of this security’s payoff across successor nodes. Along with a trader’s actual
consumption over these nodes, one can extract some information about this trader’s
beliefs over successor nodes. In a complete markets economy, security prices reveal
these beliefs perfectly. Equilibrium security prices and consumption for a given node
st can be summarized in the no-arbitrage equation:
qt = ρ
i(t+ 1|st)M
i(st) (7)
M i(st) is a matrix determined by the equilibrium consumption of trader i in successor
nodes of st. This is the traditional no-arbitrage equation (6) rewritten to make trader
i’s conditional beliefs more apparent. Given an equilibrium, this trader’s conditional
beliefs can then be extracted from this equation. These conditional beliefs, over all
nodes, can be then put together to construct beliefs over the whole σ−field. We say
that an economy E∞(D,, ω, A) has complete markets if j(st) = b(st) for all st ∈ D and
the S × j(st) matrix At+1(st) has full rank for all st ∈ D. The complete markets result is
summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 Suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an equilibrium of a complete mar-
kets economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω,A) then the set of observationally equivalent beliefs for
each trader is a singleton.
In contrast, equation (7) doesn’t determine trader i’s conditional beliefs uniquely when
markets are incomplete, because there are fewer security prices. This is shown in the
next proposition, which makes use of the following
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Assumption 1 (Markets are Incomplete at Some Node) There exists a finite path s˜t˜ ∈
T t˜ such that Rank[At˜+1(s˜t˜)] < S.
Proposition 2 Under assumption 1, suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an equilibrium
of an incomplete markets economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω,A) then the set of observationally
equivalent beliefs for each trader is not a singleton.
The above proposition has some straightforward implications in terms of belief selec-
tion in incomplete markets. Let ρ be the true probability distribution on (S,F). We say
that trader i has rational expectations (or correct beliefs) if ρi = ρ. Blume and Easley
[10] define survival of trader i on a path s ∈ S if lim supt x
i(st) > 0. An implication of
the above propositions in the incomplete markets case is that each trader with rational
expectations has observationally equivalent beliefs which are not correct. Also, each
trader that survives ρ−almost surely has observationally equivalent beliefs which are
not correct.
Suppose we can observe all aspects of the economy except traders’ beliefs. Then,
given an equilibrium of that economy, we could not conclude that a trader who survives
has correct beliefs. This definition of belief correctness is however very strong. A trader
whose conditional beliefs are identical to the truth in all nodes except one node, has
incorrect beliefs. In the Pareto optimal economy discussed in Blume and Easley [10],
this trader may survive (if we control for other factors).
5.2 Homogeneity of Beliefs
Blume and Easley [10] show that a necessary condition for survival is that the truth
is absolutely continuous with the beliefs of traders who survive. This formalizes the
market selection hypothesis, that traders with incorrect beliefs are driven out of the
market. Here, belief correctness refers to the concept of equivalence of a trader’s
beliefs with the truth. In this section, we show that survival in incomplete markets is
consistent with beliefs not equivalent to the truth. To construct these beliefs, we require
that all traders’ conditional probabilities should be uniformly bounded away from the
edges of the unit simplex by some ε0 > 0.This ensures that observationally equivalent
beliefs can be chosen sufficiently far away from original beliefs, thus allowing "sufficient
room for disagreement" from a trader’s original beliefs.
Assumption 2 There must exist an ε0 > 0 such that the ε0−ball
9 Bε0(ρ(.|st)) ⊂ R
S
++
for all st ∈ D
+.
The first step is to construct observationally equivalent beliefs that are not equivalent
to a trader’s original beliefs. We do this by constructing conditional beliefs uniformly
bounded away from original beliefs, we then use Blackwell and Dubin’s theorem to
show that these new beliefs cannot be equivalent to original beliefs. We recall the
following definition and result.
9We use the sup norm (‖x‖S = supi∈S |xi|).
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Definition 3 Agent i ∈ I and j ∈ I’s beliefs eventually become homogeneous if there
is a set A ∈ F such that : P k(A) = 1 for k = i, j and for all s ∈ A, supB∈F |P
i
st(B) −
P jst(B)| → 0 as t→∞.
Proposition 3 If two probability measures are equivalent (meaning: ρi(B) = 0 ⇔
ρj(B) = 0 for all B ∈ F) then the posterior probabilities eventually become homoge-
neous.
Proof. Blackwell and Dubins (1962).
Evidently, we must strengthen our notion of market incompleteness to ensure that
we can choose observationally equivalent conditional beliefs sufficiently far away from
original beliefs, infinitely often.
Assumption 3 (Markets are Incomplete Infinitely Often) For each i ∈ I, there exists a
set Ai ∈ F of positive measure ρ
i such that Rank[At+1(st)] < S i.o. on each path
s ∈ Ai.
A sufficient condition for assumption 2 is that markets are incomplete at every node in
the tree with Rank(Aj(st, t+ 1)) < S.
Proposition 4 Under assumptions 2 and 3, suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an
equilibrium of an economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then the set of observationally equiv-
alent beliefs for trader i ∈ I contains beliefs not equivalent to ρi.
The main result of this paper is an implication of the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Under assumptions 2 and 3, suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an equi-
librium of an economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω,A) then the set of observationally equivalent
beliefs for trader i ∈ I contains beliefs not equivalent to the true probability distribution
ρ.
Proof. If trader i’s beliefs are not equivalent to ρ, then we’re done. If they are, use the
previous proposition.
If we can observe all aspects of the economy except for traders’ beliefs, then given
an equilibrium, a trader who survives ρ−a.s. has beliefs consistent with this survival
that are not equivalent to ρ. This is in contrast to the Pareto optimal result of Blume
and Easley [10]. Note that our result doesn’t rely on assumptions about discount
factors, or even the precise definition of survival. This is because it is the no-arbitrage
equation along with the asset structure that determines a trader’s set of observationally
equivalent beliefs, in particular a surviving trader’s beliefs.
We also obtain the result that two traders who survive may strongly disagree about the
truth. This is a direct implication of the following
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Corollary 2 Under assumptions 2 and 3, suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an equilib-
rium of an economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then each trader has observationally equivalent
beliefs that are not equivalent to another trader’s beliefs.
Finally, note that in incomplete markets economies with Pareto efficient outcomes, all
traders beliefs must converge with the truth (see for example Sandroni [16]). Because
of the asset structure, we may construct observationally equivalent beliefs for the sur-
viving traders that do not merge with the truth. In this case, the original outcome is still
an equilibrium but it is no longer Pareto efficient: so any incomplete markets equilib-
rium outcome where traders with incorrect beliefs survive almost surely with respect to
the truth must be Pareto efficient. This result is expected since outcomes are generi-
cally Pareto inefficient in incomplete markets economies, but it shows that the above
results are not in contradiction with previous work on belief selection in Pareto efficient
economies.
6 Survival in a Two Trader Economy
We have shown that incomplete markets select for a wide range of beliefs, including
beliefs that do not merge with the truth. However when all surviving traders have be-
liefs that are observationally equivalent to the truth, incorrect expectations may not
affect the asset price process. As a result, incomplete markets may select for beliefs
that are incorrect in ways that are irrelevant for survival. In a simple two-trader econ-
omy with a unique consumption in each period and state and where asset markets are
incomplete in each period, we show that traders with incorrect beliefs may both survive
and affect asset prices.
We consider an economy E∞ with two identical traders i and j and the corresponding
no-trade outcome. We denote the “true” probability distribution by λ. Because there is
no trade, both traders survive according to any probability distribution and in particular
the truth. We modify the economy (now called E ′∞) by assigning trader i a different
discount factor and different beliefs such that the no-trade outcome is still an equilib-
rium of the new economy. Given that the two traders do not trade in the new economy,
they both survive. What makes the result interesting is that the modified economy can
be constructed so that one of the two surviving traders is both less patient and has
less accurate beliefs than the other surviving trader. Moreover, such inaccurate beliefs
matter in that they affect the market outcome: had this trader known the truth, the equi-
librium outcome would have been different. This is a direct implication of the fact that
the truth does not lie in the set of observationally equivalent beliefs of the surviving
trader.
More formally, trader i’s discount factor (δ′)
i
is chosen in an open neighborhood N of
trader j’s discount factor δj where δ
′i ∈ N −
{
δj
}
. Trader i’s beliefs (ρ′)i are chosen
such that the truth does not lie in her set of observationally equivalent beliefs: λ /∈[
(ρ′)i
]i
E ′
∞
. Trader i survives according to the truth. This occurs in the presence of
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trader j, who knows the truth (and who also survives). For simplicity, we assume that
markets are incomplete at all nodes.
Assumption 3’ Markets are Incomplete at all Nodes: There are S states of the world
each period, and Rank[At+1(st)] = J < S for all t and st ∈ D.
Assumption 4 Traders have identical Bernoulli utilities v and identical endowment
processes ω ∈ l∞(D× L) uniformly bounded away from zero and infinity and
each ω (st) is assumed to lie outside a closed set of measure zero. Asset payoffs
[At+1(st)] are also assumed to lie outside a closed set of measure zero for all t
and st ∈ D.
The closed sets of measure zero mentioned in assumption 4 are constructed in the
proof of proposition 5 and depend on the choice of Bernoulli utilities.
Proposition 5 Suppose that assumptions 2, 3’ and 4 hold. Consider an economy
E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) with two identical traders i and j and consider the corresponding
no trade outcome. There exists a neighborhood N of δj such that for all discount
factors (δ′)
i
for trader i where (δ′)
i
∈ N−
{
δj
}
, there exist beliefs (ρ′)i such that the no-
trade outcome remains an equilibrium for the new economy E ′∞ (D, ρ
′, δ′, v, ω, A) where
ρ′ =
(
(ρ′)i , ρj
)
and δ′ =
(
(δ′)
i
, δj
)
. The economy E ′∞ has the following properties.
1. Trader i survives ρ′ − a.s. for any process ρ′
2. If λ ∈ [ρi]
i
E∞
then λ /∈
[
(ρ′)i
]i
E ′
∞
3. (ρ′)i can be chosen such that the true process λ is not equivalent to (ρ′)i.
The no trade outcome for economy E∞ clearly implies that the two traders consume
their (identical) endowment process and survive according to any distribution ρ. In
particular both traders will survive in economy E∞ according to the true distribution λ.
In order to make our argument stronger, let us assume that indeed both traders either
know the truth (so that ρi = ρj = λ) or that they have beliefs such that knowing the
truth would be observationally equivalent (i.e. ρi ∈ [λ]iE∞ and ρ
j ∈ [λ]jE∞).
Consider now the modified economy E ′∞: trader i’s beliefs and discount factor have
been changed to (ρ′)i and (δ′)
i
respectively, while all other features of the economy
have been kept the same. In particular the (identical) endowment process has not
been altered for the two traders, and trader j’s beliefs have been kept equal to λ (or
any ρ ∈ [λ]jE∞) and her discount factor remains δ
j. Proposition 5 shows that trader i’s
beliefs and discount factor can be modified so that the no trade outcome remains an
equilibrium in E ′∞. As a result, traders i and j survive according to any distribution ρ
′
(property #1), and in particular according to the true probability distribution λ.
Also, proposition 5 shows that if in economy E∞ trader i knows the truth, or more gener-
ally has beliefs that are observationally equivalent to the truth (i.e. λ ∈ [ρi]
i
E∞
) , then in
the modified economy E ′∞ one can choose beliefs for trader i such that the truth is not
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observationally equivalent to her new beliefs (ρ′)i (i.e. λ /∈
[
(ρ′)i
]i
E ′
∞
) (property #2). In
particular, this means that if trader i were to adopt correct beliefs λ, equilibrium prices
for the economy E ′∞ would no longer satisfy her optimality conditions or budget con-
straints: therefore, the equilibrium prices and consumption streams that characterize
economy E ′∞ would no longer be an equilibrium for the economy E
′′
∞ (D, ρ
′′, δ′, v, ω, A)
where ρ′′ = (λ, ρj) and δ′ =
(
(δ′)
i
, δj
)
. This shows that the incorrect beliefs that trader
i has adopted impact asset prices: if they were equal to the truth, the equilibrium
outcome would be different.
Finally, property #3 states that beliefs for trader i may be chosen so that they are far
from the truth λ in a probabilistic sense. In addition, note that the discount factor (δ′)
i
may be chosen so that trader i is less patient than trader j and trader i has incorrect
beliefs.
The construction of both the discount factor and the (incorrect) beliefs of trader i sheds
light on the nature of the result. The discount factor and beliefs of trader i were built
near those of trader j using a continuity argument that relies on the existence of incom-
plete markets in each period. The problem reduces to choosing conditional beliefs in
each period and a suitable discount factor near the original ones: incomplete markets
ensure that the number of unknowns (in this case, the vector of conditional beliefs) is
larger than the number of equations. Incomplete markets therefore allow trader i to
be less patient10 than trader j and make counterveiling “cognitive mistakes” as cap-
tured by her beliefs that ensure that her consumption remains positive in each period.
The model does not impose any particular condition on the nature of incomplete mar-
kets necessary to make this result possible: it only requires that the number of assets
traded each period is smaller than the number of states each period. If endowments
and payoffs are stationary and beliefs and the truth follow and iid process, Blume and
Easley [10] show that a trader who survives almost surely with respect to the truth
must have the highest survival index11. Here, trader i may be chosen to be more im-
patient and have incorrect beliefs so her survival index is smaller than trader j’s, yet
she survives λ− a.s.
The paper by Beker and Chattopadhyay [4] sheds further light on the issue of survival
of traders in incomplete markets economies. They consider a two trader economy with
one good and a short-lived asset in each period that traders can use to hedge against
their uncertain endowment. Under some conditions and in a fairly general setting, they
show that if a trader’s consumption is positive eventually then the consumption of the
other trader must tend to zero eventually. Alternatively, it may be that both agents’
consumption is arbitrarily close to zero infinitely often. Hence incomplete markets
prevent heterogeneous traders from both keeping their consumption levels bounded
away from zero: one of the two traders must vanish, even when both traders share
the same discount factors and the same (possibly correct) beliefs. As a result, not
only do incomplete markets not favour heterogeneity of beliefs but may indeed result
in traders with correct beliefs vanishing from the markets. This may appear in contrast
10Or more patient.
11log δk − Iρ(ρ
k) where δk is trader k’s discount factor and Iρ(ρ
k) is the relative entropy of trader k’s
beliefs with respect to the truth.
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with our result, where heterogeneity of beliefs in the long run is indeed favoured by
market incompleteness.
However, the result in [4] requires that the ratio of marginal rates of substitution dis-
plays one period ahead conditional variability (see theorem 1 (ii) in [4]). In our notation,
this would require that
ρi(st|st−1)
ρj(st|st−1)
v′(c2(st))/v′(c1(st))
v′(c2(st−1))/v′(c1(st−1))
displays conditional variability in the
limit in the economy E ′∞. Notice however that this expression reduces to
ρi(st|st−1)
ρj(st|st−1)
since
traders consume their endowments and have identical Bernoulli utility functions. In
our construction of ρi(st|st−1), the probability of state st conditioning on state st−1, we
use a continuity argument that ensures that conditional beliefs ρi (st|st−1) are near to
ρj (st|st−1) for each period t and every path st. The same argument is used to con-
struct trader i’s discount factor within a neighborhood of the original discount factor δ.
Our construction complements the results of Beker and Chattophadyay [4] in that we
display an example where both traders survive when the ratio of their marginal rates
of substitution does not display one period ahead conditional variability in the limit. In
addition, we have shown that the beliefs of one trader may be far from the truth in that
they may not be equivalent to the true probability distribution.
Finally, note that our construction relies on the no-trade outcome in the setup of our
economy. The no-trade outcome, in turn, relies on both traders being identical in every
respect in the original economy E∞; endowments are arbitrary and therefore do not
necessarily provide Pareto optimal equilibrium consumption streams.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we model an infinite horizon economy, with a view to testing the mar-
ket selection hypothesis under market incompleteness. We know from the literature
(Sandroni [16], Blume and Easley [10]) that markets with a Pareto optimal outcome or,
more narrowly, complete markets select for correct beliefs. All surviving traders have
correct beliefs (i.e. beliefs that can be represented by probability distributions that
merge with the truth). Both wealth and consumption of traders whose beliefs are in-
correct converge to zero with true probability one. Hence in the long run heterogeneity
of beliefs is not persistent and market outcomes reflect the true probability distribution
over returns.
The motivation for our study lies in two counterexamples provided by Blume and Easley
[10] that point to the fact that the same need not hold under market incompleteness.
In this paper we show that incomplete markets do not select for correct beliefs. In par-
ticular we prove that when markets are incomplete the set of beliefs that is consistent
with a trader’s survival admits beliefs which are not equivalent to the truth, and these
incorrect beliefs may matter.
We build our first result on the characterisation of the set of observationally equiva-
lent beliefs. Given an economy and its corresponding equilibrium, this is the set of
beliefs for a trader that are consistent with the same equilibrium allocation and prices.
If a trader had to adopt different beliefs belonging to this set, the equilibrium outcome
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would remain unchanged. We show that, while in complete market economies the set
of observationally equivalent beliefs admits only one element, under market incom-
pleteness this set is not a singleton. Moreover, it always admits probability distributions
that are not equivalent to the truth. This result holds for all traders and in particular for
surviving traders. Hence one can always find beliefs that differ significantly from the
true probability distribution and that still allow a trader to survive and have an impact
on market outcomes in the long run.
An immediate corollary of our result is that heterogeneity of beliefs is persistent: sur-
viving traders need not share the same beliefs in the long run. Under incomplete
markets asset prices reflect a range of underlying probability distributions that gen-
erate them. These distributions offer conflicting evidence on the probability of some
events and influence asset prices.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Preliminary
The following proposition is used in the proof of proposition (2) .
Proposition 6 Suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an equilibrium of an economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω,A).
Let
(
λi
)
i∈I
be probability distributions on (S,F) such that:
qj(st) =
∑
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
λi(C(st+1))δiv
i
1(x
i(st+1))
λi(C(st))vi1(x
i(st))
Aj(st+1) for all st ∈ T
t, j ∈ J, t ∈ T
Then
(
λi
)
i∈I
are observationally equivalent to (ρi)i∈I.
Proof. Set:
ψi(st) = δ
t
iv
i
1(x
i(st))λ
i(C(st)) for all st ∈ T
t, t ∈ T
So the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied:
ψi(st)qj(st) =
∑
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
ψi(st+1)Aj(st+1) for all st ∈ T
t, j ∈ J, t ∈ T
Note that the other FOCs of trader i’s optimization problem are satisfied. Indeed,
we know that:
ρi(C(st))δ
t
iv
i
l(x
i(st)) = π
i(st)pl(st) for all st ∈ T
t, l ∈ L, t ∈ T
So that:
ρi(C(st))δ
t
i
πi(st)
vil(x
i(st)) = pl(st) for all st ∈ T
t, l ∈ L, t ∈ T
So that (with p1(st) = 1):
pl(st)
p1(st)
= pl(st) =
vil(x
i(st))
vi1(x
i(st))
for all st ∈ T
t, l ∈ L, t ∈ T
So, given that:
δtiv
i
1(x
i(st))λ
i(C(st)) = ψ
i(st) for all st ∈ T
t, t ∈ T (8)
It follows that:
δti
vil(x
i(st))
pl(st)
λi(C(st)) = ψ
i(st) for all st ∈ T
t, l ∈ L, t ∈ T
Or:
λi(C(st))δ
t
iv
i
l(x
i(st)) = ψ
i(st)pl(st) for all st ∈ T
t, l ∈ L, t ∈ T
So all FOCs are satisfied. Since (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an equilibrium with transver-
sality condition for the economy E∞ (D, ρ, v, ω, A), it follows from theorem 5.2 of [15] that
((x, z), (p, q)) is an equilibrium with implicit debt constraint for the economy E∞ (D, ρ, v, ω,A).
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So (qzi) ∈ l∞(D) for all i ∈ I. So ((x, z), (p, q)) is an equilibrium with implicit debt con-
straint for the economy E∞(D,
′, ω, A). Since preferences in the economy E∞(D,
′
, ω, A) satisfy assumptions A1−A6 in [15], theorem 5.2 of [15] implies the existence of
present value vectors νi, i ∈ I so that (x, z), (p, q, (νi)i∈I) is an equilibrium with transver-
sality condition for the economy E∞(D,
′, ω, A). Incidentally, it follows that νi = ψi for
all i ∈ I, since (νi)i∈I satisfies equation (8).
8.2 Proof of Proposition (1)
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists an equilibrium (x, z), (p, q, (ψi)i∈I) where trader
i’s preferences are represented by the expected utility Eλ
i
[∑
t∈T
δtiv
i(xit)
]
. Note that
(ψi)i∈I must satisfy:
qj(st) =
∑
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
ψi(st+1)
ψi(st)
Aj(st+1) for all st ∈ T
t, j ∈ J, t ∈ T
Set ψit+1(st) =
(
ψi(st, 1), .., ψ
i(st, S)
)
. So, the above equation in matrix form is:
q(st) =
ψit+1(st)
ψi(st)
At+1(st) for all st ∈ T
t, t ∈ T
Where At+1(st) is an S × j(st) matrix and q(st) is a 1× j(st) vector. Since markets
are complete, A is square and has full rank. So the above equation has a unique
solution, which we know is
πit+1(st)
πi(st)
. Hence
ψit+1(st)
ψi(st)
=
πit+1(st)
πi(st)
for all st ∈ T
t, t ∈ T. Finally,
in period 0, ψ(s0) = π(s0) by construction. So ψ
i = πi. So equation (8) implies that
λi(C(st)) = ρ
i(C(st)) for s = (st, ..) ∈ S. So λ
i and ρi agree on sets in ∪t∈NFt. This set
is closed under finite intersections and hence is a π−system. The π − λ theorem and
it’s implication (theorem 3.3 in [7]) in turn implies that λi = ρi, a contradiction.
8.3 Proof of Proposition (2)
Proof. Choose a process λi(C(st)) ∈ [0, 1] for all st ∈ D so that λ
i(C(s0)) = 1 and:∑
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
[
δiv
i
1(x
i(st+1))Aj(st+1)
]
λi(C(st+1)) = v
i
1(x
i(st))qj(st)λ
i(C(st))∑
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
λi(C(st+1)) = λ
i(C(st))
Then, by Kolmogorov’s Existence Theorem (see theorem 36.1 in Billingsley [7]), λi
is a probability distribution on (T∞,F), proposition (6) applies and
(
λi
)
i∈I
are observa-
tionally equivalent to (ρi)i∈I. We simplify this system by rewriting it.∑
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
[
δiv
i
1(x
i(st+1))Aj(st+1)
]
λi(st+1|st) = v
i
1(x
i(st))qj(st) (9)∑
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
λi(st+1|st) = 1
22
Given a process λi(st+1|st), one can reconstruct a probability distribution on (T
∞,F)
by setting, recursively:
λi(C(s1)) = λ
i(s1|s0)λ
i(C(s0)) = λ
i(s1|s0) for all s1 = (s0, s)
λi(C(st+1)) = λ
i(st+1|st)λ
i(C(st)) for all st+1 = (st, s) for t ∈ T− {0}
Set λi(.|st) = ρ
i(.|st) for all st = s˜t˜. λ
i(.|s˜t˜) is chosen such that λ
i(.|s˜t˜) = ρ
i(.|s˜t˜) and
such that system of equations (9) is satisfied (this is possible because markets are
incomplete, see below). Then the resulting probability distribution λi is different from
ρi but observationally equivalent to ρi, by proposition (6) in section (8.1) .
How to choose an appropriate λi(.|s˜t˜) = ρ
i(.|s˜t˜): Note that the set of equations in
(9) can be rewritten as:
M i(st)λ
i(.|st) = q(st)
Where:
M i(st) =
δi
vi1(x
i(st))
 v
i
1(x
i(s1t+1))A1(s
1
t+1) ... v
i
1(x
i(sSt+1))A1(s
S
t+1)
...
. . .
...
vi1(x
i(s1t+1))AJ(s
1
t+1) ... v
i
1(x
i(sSt+1))AJ(s
S
t+1)

Note that M i(s˜t˜) has full rank equal to the rank of At˜+1(s˜t˜, ) < S. Since we know
that ρi(.|s˜t˜) solves the system of equations in (9), we know the solution set Λ(s˜t˜) is
linear and of dimension at least 1. We know that ρi(.|s˜t˜) ∈ R
S
++ and is interior to the
unit simplex, by construction. Using the sup norm (‖x‖S = supi∈S |xi|), choose an
ε > 0 sufficiently small such that Bε(ρ
i(.|s˜t˜)) ⊂ R
S
++, and choose an element λ¯
i
(.|s˜t˜) ∈
Bε(ρ
i(.|s˜t˜)) ∩ Λ(s˜t˜) such that λ¯
i
(.|s˜t˜) = ρ
i(.|s˜t˜).
8.4 Proof of Proposition (4)
Proof. We use the construction in the proof of proposition (2) by choosing ε = ε0 at the
end of the proof. On each path s ∈ Ai, build a probability distribution λ
i by choosing
λi(.|st) ∈ [Bε0(ρ
i(.|st)) ∩ Λ(st)]−Bε0/2(ρ
i(.|st)) for all st, t ∈ T such that Rank(Aj(st, t+
1)) < S and such that s = (st, ..). If the rank condition is not satisfied on these paths,
choose λi(.|st) = ρ
i(.|st). For paths s /∈ Ai, choose λ
i(.|st) = ρ
i(.|st).
For each path s ∈ Ai, we show that:
lim
t→+∞
sup
B∈G
|λist(B)− ρ
i
st(B)| ≥
ε0
2
(10)
Where G = {C(st) : s = (st, ..) for all t ∈ T}. Then we show that:
lim
t→+∞
sup
B∈G
|λist(B)− ρ
i
st(B)| ≤ limt→+∞
sup
B∈F
|λist(B)− ρ
i
st(B)| when G ⊂ F (11)
This in turn implies that limt→+∞ supB∈F |λ
i
st(B)− ρ
i
st(B)| > 0 on a set of paths that
trader i assigns positive measure. Blackwell and Dubins’ result implies in turn that
λiand ρi are not equivalent.
We now show inequality (10) . On a path s ∈ Ai, let at = supB∈G |λ
i
st(B) − ρ
i
st(B)|
and a = limt→+∞ at. Suppose that a <
ε0
2
. Choose δ > 0 such that Bδ(a) ∩ {
ε0
2
} = ∅.
There is a Tδ ∈ T such that t ≥ Tδ ⇒ |at−a| < δ. Since at <
ε0
2
for t ≥ Tδ, it follows that
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|λist(B)−ρ
i
st(B)| <
ε0
2
for t ≥ Tδ. But this contradicts the existence of a B ∈ G such that
|λist(B) − ρ
i
st(B)| ≥
ε0
2
i.o. on path s ∈ Ai. Take B = C(st+1) where st+1 = (st, s) and
where s is chosen such that
∣∣λi(s|st)− ρi(s|st)∣∣ ≥ ε02 . This s must exist by construction
of λi(.|st).
Inequality (11) is obvious: let at = supB∈G |λ
i
st(B)− ρ
i
st(B)| and a = limt→+∞ at and
bt = supB∈F |λ
i
st(B)−ρ
i
st(B)| and b = limt→+∞ bt. Suppose that a > b. Let η = a−b > 0.
Choose ε = η
4
. There exists a Tε ∈ T such that t ≥ Tε ⇒ |at − a| < ε and |bt − b| < ε.
So if t ≥ Tε, at > bt so at >
at+bt
2
≥ supB∈G |λ
i
st(B) − ρ
i
st(B)| so at is not the sup, a
contradiction.
8.5 Proof of Proposition (5)
Proof. Consider an economy with 2 identical traders where ρ, δ, v represent common
beliefs, discount factors, and Bernoulli utility. Consider the matrices:
B (st) =
 v1(ω
(
s1t+1
)
)A1(s
1
t+1) ... v1(ω
(
sSt+1
)
)A1(s
S
t+1)
...
. . .
...
v1(ω
(
s1t+1
)
)AJ(s
1
t+1) ... v1(ω
(
sSt+1
)
)AJ(s
S
t+1)

Here, st+1 is a S × 1 vector where (st, s) is its s−th element. For each period t and
each state st, consider the set (A
∗ (st+1) , ω
∗ (st+1)) ∈ R
S×J × RS such that the 1 × S
vector I = (1, .., 1) ∈ SpanB(st). So (A
∗ (st+1) , ω
∗ (st+1)) is the set of all payoffs and
endowments such that the matrix
[
B(st)
I
]
is not of full rank. This is a closed set of
measure zero in the space RS×J × RS; the proof is an application of the pre-image
theorem. See pages 21 and 27 of Guillemin and Pollack [14]. For each period t, and
for each state st, choose (A (st+1) , ω (st+1)) outside of this closed set of measure zero;
choose endowments ω for each agent so that endowments of agent i are equal to
endowments of agent j.
Let (x, z), (q, (πk)k∈{i,j}) be a corresponding no-trade equilibrium outcome for this
economy, labelled E . The asset price process is represented by the equation q(st) =
M(st)ρ(.|st) where M(st) =
δB(st)
v1(ω(st))
. This price process q ∈ l∞ (D×J); this is because
the endowment process is uniformly bounded away from zero and from infinity. For
each node st, choose µ(st) > 0 and ρ
i(.|st) ∈ R
S
++ such that:
q(st)
(1 + µ (st))
= M(st)ρ
i(.|st) (12)
And such that: ∑
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
ρi(st+1|st) = 1 (13)
Rewriting equations (12) and (13), the system of equationsB(st)ρ
i(.|st) =
q(st)v1(ω(st))
δ(1+µ(st))
and
∑
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
ρi(st+1|st) = 1 has a non-empty solution set because by con-
struction,
[
B(st)
I
]
is of full rank less than or equal to S. Denote this set by Λ(st).
Choose µ(st) > 0 sufficiently close to zero so that Λ(st) ∩ B ε0
2
(ρ(.|st)) = ∅. This
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guarantees a solution ρi(.|st) ∈ R
S
++ which is
ε0
2
−bounded away from the unit sim-
plex. Choose such (µ(st), ρ
i(.|st)) for all st, t ∈ T. Note that a unique µ = µ (st)
can be chosen such that µ > 0. This is because the price sequence q(st) is uni-
formly bounded. Using Kolmogorov’s existence theorem, construct a ρi, a probability
distribution on (S,F) that represents trader i’s beliefs whose marginals equal ρi(.|st),
marginals that are ε0
2
−bounded away from the unit simplex. Also, choosing µ such
that δ (1 + µ) < 1, let δi = δ (1 + µ) represent trader i’s discount factor. Notice now
that (x, z), (p, q
1+µ
, (πk)k∈{i,j}) is a (no-trade) equilibrium for the economy E
′ where E ′ is
identical to the economy E except that agent i has beliefs ρi and a discount factor δi.
Because
q(st)
1+µ
= q(st) for all st, t ∈ T, we have that if ρ
′ ∈ [ρ]iE then ρ
′ /∈ [ρi]
i
E ′. This shows
property #2. Property #1 holds because it’s a no-trade equilibrium and endowments
are assumed uniformly bounded away from zero.
The same construction can be made by choosing µ such that µ < 0 < δ (1 + µ) < 1
hence we can construct a small neighborhood around δ around which we can construct
the the economy E ′ by choosing trader i’s discount factor, such that δi = δ. Property
#3 follows from the fact that ρi’s conditional probabilities are uniformly bounded away
from the unit simplex and proposition (4) applies.
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